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Sociology andp[Ychoana!Jsis have one common insight - that they can
conceptualize the objective, [Ymbolically general forms of human
interaction. However, thf!Y can never grasp the private experience, feelings
and unconscious meanings of the individual "as they really are. In
p[Ychoana!Jsis thisis most outspoken - the real andimaginary spheres in
which we all live are to a great extent outside the [YmbolicaL. Thus, I
think sociology in genera~ and 'en/ica/' sociology and the sociology of
knowledge inparticular have something to learn frompsychoana!Jsis. My
point in this article is simpfy to reconsider what sociology can learn from
psychoanafysis. In doing so, I am nottrying to construct a new 'synthesis'.
This article treats three basic features: how sociology andpJYchoana!Jsis
share basic assumptions onsodabiliry; how they both have interacted with
the modernization of soaety; finally how "!y discussion can be related to
the difficultproject ofa 'oitico! theory'.
The Sociological Discourse
Sociology is a discourse· on the 'social', a discourse that was
constituted when an understanding of the dynamics of the emerging
modem capitalist society seemed imperative. Emile Durkheim found
such dynamics in the 'social facts' - the division of labour, collective
religiosity and so on. Karl Marx found them in class struggle, that the
• Direct all correspondence to Goran Dahl, Lund University, Box 114, S-221 00 Lund,
Sweden. This article was originally written in 1995, the main purpose was to reconsider some
of my arguments in my doctoral dissertation (Dahl 1986). Thanks to Zygmunt Bauman for
his encoragument and comments, also thanks to Mark Worrell for his comments.
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SOC10!OgtSts were afraid of - that the economic man ld .
wou exterminate
the cultivated man. But besides this 'cultural' trend 3 I think th t al
find ' ial' ' a we so
can . a SOCI tren~. A 'trend' that is neither especially conservative or
moderrust, but has an mterest in finding the roots of sociability.
Here w~ find contributions by Georg Sirnmel, George Herbert
Mead - and Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan Th th ' I
. . e eSIS now want toexp!or~ .IS as follows: as ~o~g .aswe are concerned with a formal theory of
socla?tlity, ~sychoanalysls IS tmpossible to overlook. But when we are to
~xpl~ S?Clal phenomena .moving from formal theory to substantial
1flves~gatton~, psyc~O~alYSIS must remain in its own discourse, if it is
used in SOCiology It 1S able to explain everything, and di I
th o accor mg yno mg.
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A Formal Theory of Sociability
\Vhat I will outline here is neither an established, institutionalized
theory,. nor a finished system." Rather, it is a systematization of
some~g .that has to be taken for granted by sociolo . M
systemattzallon has the form of a number of 'bo 'h gyh b Yxes, were eac ox
.represents a develope.d ~eory, or at least a theoretical fragment. Th~
contents of each box IS bnefly described after the figure.
3 This trend was continued . . . .
anthropology. A rather well-Im~~::ua;e'i~ ~o~~eh~:ns::~gi~~and ~h~osophical~It w:ou1d,;f course, be possible to use 'social psychology' i~slead :: a'le:''?!H;~:::'th t
an 15 use m so many ways, that it would lead to confusions in this context. . , a
-r-·-
J~..;.,
,,:~~0.
t{l
;.;.~ .
essential political-economical existence is based on the belonging to a
specific class. Max Weber originally had a more economic and historical
perspective, depending upon his suspicions against general concepts, but
gradually moved closer to a general theory of the rationalization of the
world. .
This stream can be criticized both for being nostalgic and for having
dangerous political implications.f It is, of course; one-dimensional,
dualist and conservative. But a more serious problem is that this dualist
tradition is unable to capture important dynamics of modem society -
integration, differentiation, system-development. In this light, both
Durkheim and Marx (and, of course, contemporary theorists such as
Giddens and Luhmann) offer us a more enlightened understanding of
modem society. Durkheim 'discovered' 'social facts', that is, when society
ismodemized and differentiated, the actions of the individuals are co-
ordinated by institutions they often are unaware of - symbolic systems,
the division of labour, the market, etc. Among Marx's contributions we
find the radicalization of traditional political economy - that the political
economy is both a system and a corresponding form of thought unable
too reflect upon itself.
Sociology never was, and will probably never become, one unified
homogenous discourse. One source of heterogeneity is the differences
between a conservative perspective, based on cultural criticism and a
modernist perspective. The former perspective was dominant in the early
German sociology, with proponents such as Ferdinand Tonnies, Alfred
Weber, Hans Freyer, and (partly) the young Mannheirn.l The keywords
in this conservative sociology were above all Kultur versus Zivilisation. The
old traditionalist society was understood as a cultural unit, a Gemelnschaft,
while the new emerging society was described as an abstract sum of
atomized individuals, a GeseLlschaft. The concrete was replaced by the
abstract.
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Besides this dominant trend in sociology which seeks to understand
the dynamics of modem society, I would argue that there exists a trend
aiming at constructing a formal theory, a theory that explores what the
'social' is, the sociability. If there is no such theory, sociology looses its
right to exist - society might then be understood as nothing more than an
economic system. Of course, this was what many of the conservative
1 The best overview on German sociology so far in English is Volker Meja et. al.. (eds.),
Modem German Soa%gy.
2 For a both extreme and one-dimensional example of this kind of critique, see Georg
Lukacs, The Destrudion ofReason. For a more sophisticated and balanced discussion of the
problems associated with using 'Culture' as a standpoint and reference for critique of society
and thinking, see Richard Wolin, The TermsojCIIIbmJ/Critici.rm.
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dyad. It is a form of concrete pre-sociability, just like Mead's 'significant
other', not anyone else, but a concrete person. The processes on this level
is not primarily work or communication, but play (Huizinga 1955),
imitation (Tarde 1890), and mimesis. In reality, many relationships arise
on the border between the dyad and the triad. For example, the
passionate love - where the partners are trying to be everything that the
other partner desires - at first seems like a dyad. But it might become
destructive if the lovers do not discover the triadic element, that they are
partly outside and more than their respective mirror-images of each
other.
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The social level, boxes 1 and 2 have in common that its form of
existence is digital, and the non-rational level, boxes 3 and 4, exists as
analogue. An analogue form of existence has no boundaries, it is
amorphous and continuous. One example is the thermometer, which
tries to imitate something in nature - 'temperature'. The analogue may be
digitalized through a decision, and this marks the entrance of sociability.
For example, temperature is without borders, but we can decide what
temperature we want to have indoors by using a thennostat, which can
be either 'on' or 'off', nothing else. Thus, the social creates boundaries,
oppositions, negations, it digitalizes the amorphous, the fantastic and
playful.S This digitalization is the homological link between social and
symbolical structures, and becomes visible in a chain of oppositions:
member/not-member, having/lacking, father/mother, man/woman and
so on. The transition from analogue to digital also has an ethical aspect.
While society is mediated by objective institutionalized laws and rules,
the dyadic relation has an immediate character, I am responsible for
being everythingftt; not with the other.
4. In psychoanalysis, the dyadic is the 'imaginary' (Lacan), this is both an
'order' - our phantasms about being a whole person, filling the lack with
an object - and a stage in the child's development, where. the mother is
the mirror-image of the child, the eyes and the breasts confirming the
own existence. But the imaginary is not the whole, it becomes impossible
to unite oneself with the mirror-image, the mother, She can be absent,
and there is an Other also desiring the mother, who the mother desires,
and that has something that the child lacks. The child's response to this is
the Oedipus constellation, the entrance into language, its acceptance of
laws and authority. Freud's famous example of this transitions is the
'Fort/da'-play performed by a little boy, when he plays with a cotton reel
he represents the mother's absence symbolically.
5 For the distinction analogue/digital, see Gregory Bateson, Towards an Ecology tifthe Mind, or
Anthony Wilden, SystemandStmcture.
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1. The central work here is Simmel's analysis of groups: the qualitative
difference between a two-person group, a dyad, and a group of three~ a
triad (Simmel 1983). The triad with i~s impersonal rules, 0 and Its
independence. in relation to its members, IS the nucleus of SOCIety. ~e
ifi iability is bom in the triad Mead's 'the generalized other' ISspecl c SOCl . O.
also a metaphor for pure sociability (Mead 1990). This o~er 1S ,eve~on~
else and no one, society represented. Mead also contrasts game to play,
where the former is governed by rules. Such theses represents what
could be regarded as sociology's contribution to a formal theory of
sociability. But all is not done yet. On the one hand I also want to
consider some clear parallels to psychoanalytic thought. On the. other
hand the theses mentioned so .far have a relational character, that IS, the
triad: the generalized other and the game are meaningful only if they are
related to their'other side'.
2. It is quite evident that the triad has a parallel in ps!choana1~tic
thinking. Here the Father represents the third element, the tntroduct1o~
of order, authority, objectivity and law. For Jacques Lac~ ~e Father IS
equivalent to the symbolic order, that is, langu~ge whic~ Situates and
structures us. Just like the sociological theones m~nt1oned. before,
psychoanalytic theses are dependent upon their other SIde, that IS, to be
'social' means not being something else.
3. The dyad (Simmel) is a group which lacks a life of its ow~, if on~ of
the members leaves the group or dies, so does the dyad.. It 1S a ~qu~
constellation the other is everything else than oneself. Unlike the toad, It
cannot be ~ediated or represented, and it is n?t dependent. u~on
symbolic communication. For example, is it impossible to tell a lie in a
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LEvEL DISCOURSE
Sociologv Psychoanalysis
(1) (2)
Visible Social Action Triads Oedipus
Law
(3) (4)
Non-rational Dyads Entrance
Play, Creativity into Language
Ethical Demand
(5) (6)
Irrational --- Instincts
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However, Marx implicitly discusses formalism in society and in
thinking, but in a more dialectical manner:
makes us more sensitive for the formal character of everything, even 'life'
as such has a formal side. This side becomes more and more dominant
since it becomes possible to mediate it through the dominant formal
media - money. The other side 'of 'life' - its irreducible, amorphous and
qualitative side becomes damaged in this process of objectification and
formalization, This is the tragic, and 'culturalist' aspect of Simmers
philosophy and sociology. However, there is also a strong 'social' side: the
sober registration of the role of formality, above all the triad as the
essence of social life.
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As far as I can see, Marx relates two matters here: (A) a social
epistemology, the more differentiation (division of labour) that exists, the
more abstract and formal categories (labour as such, abstract labour) are
possible to develop; and (B) that the formal categories also are realized as
power, and institutionalized, i. e. labour is measured in time, efficiency
and productivity (a Foucaultian element in Marx's thinking, indeed). This
brings in a substantial element in social life, that sociability often takes
the form of competition and conflict.
Now, it might seem that all that had been achieved thereby was to discover the
abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient relation in which human
beings - in whatever form of society - play the role of producers. This is correct
in one respect. Not in another. Indifference towards any specific kind of labour
presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single
one is any longer predominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only
in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing
appears as common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular
form alone. (Marx 1973,p. 104)
Thus, formalization (primarily a theoretical issue)6 is connected to
differentiation (which is primarily a category directed at empirical
research). But they are also disconnected: a formal theory of sociability
has no directly explanatory power in sociological investigations.
Therefore, our' next step in reconsidering the relationship between
psychoanalysis and sociology will concern the references of the
discourses, that is how their objects reflect historical and social processes.
We will now see that the differentiation of society - seen both as partial
processes, and as a whole, a repressive 'civilization' - lead to the
emergence of psychoanalysis as a discourse.
:. My us~ o~ t~is term is thus not in the sense of being the opposite of an empirical
informalization (see Cas Wouters, 'Formalization and Informalization). In fact
'infonnalization' - informal ways of talking, greeting etc. - can in a way be seen as a new
'form'.
5. Sociology often thinks in dichotomies, pairs, while psychoanalysis
often is more triangular, therefore this box is empty.
6. This is the place of Being, the body, the Real (Lacan), existe~ce
without relations. However, this 'place' is that unnameable which
constitutes an eternal opposition to society and civilization, and causes
Unbehagen. Freud developed this thought, but he ~ad a tendency towa,rds
scientism, a hope that this place could be given a neuro-cherrucal
description in the future. In this box we could also place some
philosophical counterparts: the vitalism of Bergson; Sorel's cult ofm~s
and violence; certain aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy; but unlike
psychoanalysis and sociology who ration.~zes the irrational, they tend to
celebrate the irrational - Life, Myth, Intuition etc.
In my opinion, the .best work clari~g the ~tricate c~nnections
between the boxes, and also giving them a history 1S Horkheimer's and
Adorno's Dialektik tier Aufkliirung. It might seem surprising ~o menti~n
this extremely fragmentary work in such a context. But I think that, 111
particular the excursus on Ulysses, can be read an~ understood as. the
story of the destiny of "pre-Homeric Man" entermg mod~m society.
When confronting the sirens, Ulysses moves from the non-r~1lo~~ to the
rational level, from play and Mimesis to the instmme~t~ obJeC1l:1ty th.at
arises in the symbolic world and the triad. The.pos~ibility of seemg ~s,
something other than instrumental reason, something before th.e toad,
could be understood as the memory and experience of the childhood
with its plays and mimetic activities, its magic. This is al~o a p.aradigmatic
work in providing clues to understanding .the relationship between
sociology and psychoanalysis properly. Just as the necessity of ~e
Enlightenment to 'consider itself - Horkheimer's and Ad?mo's main
thesis _ sociology must also 'consider itself. I will return to this later.
A formal theory of sociability is partly trans-historical, and partly a
modem phenomenon. I say 'formal' because ~s kind o~. theory
disregards every form of substantial contents, .thus It .has no ~p11l1ons of
what a 'good' or 'bad' sociability might consist of, ~stead It w~ts to
explore some structural preconditions that can be either recogruzed or
repressed by social agents. 'Sociability' in our formal sense has not always
'existed'. This needs clarification. Durkheim, Marx, and Weber were the
great investigators of the dynamics of development, but they did n~t
investigate the necessary preconditions for this development - th~ basic
forms of social life. What they saw was an economy becoming an
autonomous system, co-ordinated by the actions on the market, c~ea~g
new media (money). But this is what makes the forn:al aspect o~ social life
visible. This real formalization is linked to a theoretical formalist strategy.
This is most evident in Simmel's sociology: the growing objectification in
social life, above all through the circulation of more and more money,
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~ociology has of course been sensitive to this Unbehagen: Especially
the nse of fascism necessitated considerations on the need for integration
again. As many of the sociologists saw, modernity meant Sinnverlust, and
the search for new integrative institutions .and mechanisms had to be
started. We have already mentioned Parsons, and many more could be
added. F~r example those concerned with planning as a way of
strengthenUlg the democratic institutions.' Here we find Mannheim
during his English exile, he even saw a new mission for the Christian
church, going hand in hand with a new welfare state that could transmit
its essential values successfully, However, as we know today social
engineering is difficult enterprise. Post-modernity has given us the
experience of contingency, and a new awareness of incalculability and
risks. But apart from this integrative aspect of sociology, where it
becomes a part of the administrative power, there is also another side,
which .sometime~ ~es hand in hand with system-integration: The study
of SOCIal determinations, the revealing of illusions, 'false consciousness',
'ideologies' - a paradigm created by Marx and Mannheim. 'Social
determination' have two sides or aspects: 1) the study of how parts
interact and are integrated into a whole (e.g. functionalism); 2) the
critique of illusions, the demonstration of how actions and
communication serve the interests of the actors. In both cases a formal
theory of sociability is needed: in the former case, to explain how the
integrative mechanisms work; in the latter case to explain how interests
arise. The first aspect, the study of institutional interaction is connected
to the second, the critique of illusions, since the former requires a sober
p~~pec~ve. However, the primary reason for the ris.e of a sociological
cnnque in the form of a sociology of knowledge was social-historical - as
Fritz Ringer (1990: 236) says:
sociology notes differentiation and autonomous systems or fields, among
these the private sphere, psychoanalysis notes the growth of civilization,
a threatening process, which has a price to be paid. This is one good
reason for keeping the two discourses apart from each other, and to drop
the attempt to 'synthezise' them. If we drop such an ambition, we can
acknowledge their respective strengths better.
~ey (the sociological modernists of the Weimar republic) were so totally
dl~enc?anted ~ith the main line of mandarin orthodoxy that they came to see it
primarily as Ideology, as rationalization. Instead of merely arguing against
commonly held notions, they began to debunk or to unmask them to treat them
primarily as defences of social privilege. Max Weber's attack upon the 'literati'
who produced the 'ideas of 1914'was based on this type ofcriticism.
After this, there were no way back to a mandarin attitude, that is the
belief that 'science' is to be excluded form sociological investigations.
f~.
psychoanalysis, Modernity and Unbehagen
From the viewpoint of the sociological discourse the new society is
understood as 'modernity' (Marx, Weber) - the MaLstroem, the eternal flux
and change, detraditionalization etc. - or as a process of differentiation,
which causes a need for system-integration (Durkheim, Parsons). New
integrative mechanisms have to be found ~d created that ~ill serve ~e
needs of the system: socialization, planrung and educanon. For this
sociological discourse, the individual as such is not taken as given, rather
he or she is seen as a knot that has to be shaped and produced. Due to
the rise of new subsystems, more and more discourses, networks and
fields the individual has to exercise new strategies. As Zygmunt Bauman
(1991, p. 201), following Niklas Luhmann, puts it 'All individuals are
displaced, and displaced pennanently, existentially - wherever they find
themselves at the moment and whatever they may happen to do. They
are strangers everywhere and, their efforts .to ~e .contr~
notwithstanding, at all places. There is no single place in society in which
they are truly at home and which can bestow upon ~em a natural
identity. Individual identity becomes therefore. s<:>~ethinr; to be yet
attained (and presumably to be created) by the individual involved and
never securely and definitely possessed - as it is constantly challenged
and must be ever anew negotiated.'
For sociology, the modem .society means the quest for identi.tY for
the individuals. As Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor (1978). have Said, we
see the rise of individual 'identity-work', and the emergence of a whole
new industry which sells ego, identity and security. ~or s~ciolo~sts.with
either a culturalist or normative, conservative onentanon, this 1S of
course something that has to be criticized. For example, Richard Sennett
(1978) has coined the term 'destructive Gemeinschtifl, the new. f~nns of
social relations destroy classical values such as autonomy, digmty and
integrity.
In short, when sociology looks at the individual and her problems, it
relates this to the modem private sphere, new sensibilities, new
discourses, new professional groups, and, thus comes to define
psychoanalysis as an ideology with a new language that transfonns these
social processes into a meaningful individual code.
However, for psychoanalysis Unbehagen means more. than a search
for identity, it is a symptom of the search for truth, a glimpse o~ what
'being' means, an acceptance of death and lack, and a new relanon to
language. Psychoanalysis thematizes this experi~nce. and cons~cted a
theory about it (Trieb vs. civilization), i.e. a transhistoncal theory, in order
to cure the individual Unbehagen. Sociology on the other hand sought to
cure social pathologies, caused by sode!), not by civilization. Where
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narratives. Another important implication is, of course, that the genesis
explains the validity, there is no objective reality that comes to life
outside our active social interaction and communication. If we can leam
to accept this, we become more wise and realistic.
The point here is that one should not take social actions at face
value, as 'expressive meanings'. Where there seems to be love, solidarity
etc., rivalry, aggression and egoism might be hiding. This is a way of
taking sociology to its rightful place: one of the discourses of suspicion.
There are good reasons for being suspicious, even Karl Popper would
agree. One reason is Nietzsche's speculative thesis that the 'weak'· are the
strongest in the long run, since they develop techniques of manipulation,
lies, treason etc. This argument has been given some historical substance
by Norbert Elias (1978). According to him, we can trace the modem
form of suspicion back to the rise of the 'hiiftschl7 society. In the nobility
of the Middle ages, at the edge of the Renaissance, there emerged non-
violent strategies of how to act in order to realize interests. It was simply
more efficient to play roles, lying, acting strategic, planning intrigues,
than killing each other at the court-yard. As Shakespeare said: 'The whole
world is a theatre!'. The result of this was the rise of an hermenelJ.tics of
intentions - is the other lying, playing a role, what is he or she planning
etc.? Here we see the embryo of modem suspicion. Later on this was
reinforced by the breakdown of traditional authorities, and of course it is
even more reinforced by the breakdown of paternal authority (Mitserlich
1970). The appearance of suspicion is an. indication of a more
fundamental modem condition - the strangeness. We are all 'strangers' to
each other and to the world. \Since everything changes, the hunt for the
'real', un-strange starts. What we see is that it is our ability of asking
critical questions that has become more comprehensive, and modem
sociology is of course .apart of this. It seems better to be suspicious than
not - a pragmatic strategy, taking the 'bad' for given, to take the 'sneaky',
not the 'honest' and 'good' for given. This line of thought culminates in
the sociology of sociology and the sociologies of science and knowledge,
where also. the own premises and presuppositions are studied. We are
then watching the end of suspicion, since the categories constructed by
the suspicious mind - theory/reality, essence/appearance _ are now
recognized as constructions. Not reality 'as such', but what can be given a
broader meaning becomes the point of the sociological project.
Unlike many others, I do not believe that this development leads to
a destructive nihilism and relativism. On the contrary, it is the logical
outcome of sociology taken seriously. However, there are barriers to the
fulfilIing of this sociologist project, for example the eternal questions
MARS/ Social Thought & Research
The keywords for the study of social action are struggle (Simmel),
competition (Mannheim), and exchange. !hese fo~s o~cur when ~e
move to real life, where more than one toad or conjunctive co~~ty
exists, when sociability becomes institutionalized. The sociological
perspective, the reason for its existence, me~s to s~ow how these forms
penetrate social life and processes. In th1~, sociology often uses a
Freudian concept - the unconscious. Let me give two examples.
In one of his early essays, Mannheim (1952) argues that on~ of the
central knowledge-sociological concepts is 'documentary ~e~g'. He
gives an example: one man giving alms to a beggar. Ho~ it ~s to be
understood? The 'objective meaning', the pure registranon ~d
description does not provide us with any ne~ ~~~led~. ~e. 'expressive
meaning' the giver's own intentions, to be kind 1S subjectivist and tells
us no~g about the context But the 'documentaty meaning' of the act is
hypocrisy, that the giver masks and hides ~e social fact of pove:rr, and
the 'expressive meaning' is only a repr~ss1on of the real mearung. As
Joseph Gabel (1991) has pointed out, thi~ act can best be .under~tood ~s
'an unamsdoss manifestation of the desire to abreact his social guilt
feelings.' Thus, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge depends upon
psychoanalysis.
Most often in social life, social structures and processes are
unconscious and understood as something else, but they nevertheless
determine the sociologist's object. Pierre Bourdi~u's (~991) s~dy ~f
Martin Heidegger and his Sein und Zeit is a paradi~aoc. wor~ in ~s
context As Bourdieu demonstrates, philosophy, especially ~ He~degger s
case, is a method of making its social genesis invisible, e~en if philosophy
in its own institutionalized field is autonomous. Heidegger - a true
'conservative revolutionary' - performs a remarkabl~ manoe~vre: through
a denial of the social and modernity (which, for Heidegger 1S understood
as the inauthentic terrorism of das Man, the denial of indivi~uality an~
personal richness) he constructs a cl~an ~d eternal sphere. This sphere- ~s
constructed as Being itself. After this Heidegger has to look ~or how ~s
sphere can return to reality. As we know, Heide~r foun~ his ~swer m
national socialism. Thus, the fatality with Heidegger s anti-modern
philosophy was that he first denied t:he soci~ ge~esis - ?ntology and
'Being' as having no connection to SOC1al and ~stoncal. reality - and then
claimed that his insights have to ,be. realized S~C1~~. Th~s~ wh~t
Bourdieu performs is to expose the social un.consclo~s in ~eldegger.s
thought. This 'social unconscious' is a construazon, that 1S, no~g that IS
waiting 'out there' to be discovered, but .th~ c~nstruct1on ~f the
sociologist, which thereby casts a ~ew ~d clanfying light. over re~ty. As
far as I can see, this understanding 1S homologous. W1~ Lacan s, for
whom the Real Subject just 'is', but can be glimpsed in dialogues and a
46 7 In Gennan 'hofisch' means both being 'polite', and taking place in a court (Hof).
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Secondly, I argued that sociology properly understood - as
sociologism as subversion and critique of illusions, operates with an idea
of a 'social unconscious' - a parallel to the 'unconscious' in Lacan's sense.
Sociology in its most advanced sociological form - the sociology of
knowledge, or simply socio-sociology - has critical potentials without
being 'critical theory' (Dahl 1994). It is 'anti-centric' (Gabel 1991), and it
recognizes the idea of a social unconscious.
Thirdly, psychoanalysis makes a contribution to sociology in
reflections on relativism and validity. Here, psychoanalysis is of help
when, and if, sociology starts 'considering itself. The Truth - the object
of psychoanalysis - is something else than sociological investigations of
'truth'. In order to avoid total relativism and total rootlessness, sociology
must recognize that there is Troth - at the place where the Subject
speaks. The Troth is found in the Real - the order where the body, life
and death, Being or not Being, is situated.
I have argued that psychoanalysis and sociology taken together offer
important contributions to a formal theory of sociability. Sociology needs
such a theory, there must exist a possibility for sociability if there is to be
a society which changes, interacts and determines. We need a formal
theory of sociability if we want to explain how social determination,
systematization, integration and differentiation are possible. Where a
formal theory of sociability ends, sociology as both theoretic and
empirical discourse begins.
If we relate sociology and psychoanalysis to the perspective of
critical theory, some issues become apparent. First of all: why should we
construct such a relationship? I think that critical theory provides us with
a reflective perspective, asking us' what we want with a social theory.
Secondly, I think that a 'critical intention' (Horkheimer),lO is reasonable if
we are not pleased with what we value as hypocrisy, injustice, lack of
democracy etc. in modem society. Therefore, let us now consider the
relation between sociology and psychoanalysis from the viewpoint of the
'critical intention'.
10 See Alfred Schmidt, 'Aufklarungund Mythos im Werk Max Horkheimers'.
A critical social theory needs a keyword for its critical intention, a
concept that can be used as a counterfact when analyzing the present
_ social reality. I think that 'sociability' can perform such a function. A
formal theory of sociability might serve a critical, contrafactual function,
for example in revealing that even 'dyadic' relations have a social, 'triadic'
element, that imaginary relations are mediated by the symbolic etc.
Speaking more concretely, we can perform a critique of destructive love,
If we then avoid the antinomies and barriers mentioned and try to
fulfill the project of sociologism, there remains one problem, a problem I
think can be, if not solved, but at least reflected, by a consideration of
psychoanalysis. The problem is the question of relativism, validity and
truth. One classic text that exposes this problem is Pitrim A. Sorokin's
work on Social andCultural Dynamics from 1941.8 In this brilliant work,
Sorokin demonstrates how truth criteria are set up, and how the criteria
change through history. But if these change, what about Sorokin's own
claims of presenting a 'true' and valid analysis? This is the well-known
problem of a sociology of knowledge, and I think that the problem can
be, not 'solved', but reflected by distinguishing between 'truth' and Truth.
The utterance 'I am lying' shows that there is a Subject telling the
Troth, outside language, impossible to give a full symbolical description
and expression (Lacan 1979, p. 138ff.). This marks the return of'validi~',
while the Troth is outside sociology, it is put up as a problem 111
psychoanalysis, where it sometimes makes a glimpse, where the
unconscious Subject speaks, 'it' speaks. This conception of 'Troth' does
not mark an entrance of a new ontology, a belief in that the 'it', as
something 'out there' can be fetched and placed on the table. On the
contrary, (Lacan's) psychoanalysis tells us that the 'it' can only speak
through us, we know that the hope for a clear line between interpretation
and the interpreted object is impossible to maintain. 9
8 I have studied a part of this work -'Fluctuation of Ideational, Idealistic, and Sensate Systems
ofTruth and Knowledge', in Mathilda White Riley, SociologicalResearch.
9 I think that this insight can be found already in Freud's works. For example in the book on
the 'interpretation' of dreams (Tra1l1/ldeubm~, the Det/bing takes place in the constructed
narrative, there is no direct line to the original 'dream-thought', which only leaves traces that
has to be put together. Cf. Dahl 1995.
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Critical Social Theory and Psychoanalysis
Let me now summarize my discussion, and add a few words about
how the perspective of critical theory broadens the problems discussed.
about the interaction between the society and the individual. As I see it,
it seems like a rather fruitless attempt to strive for a final solution of the
problem of the interaction between 'Individual' and 'Society'. There is no
'solution' since the problem is an antinomy, where spokesmen for both
'individualist' or 'collectivist' perspectives can claim its correctness by
using seemingly correct and rational arguments. The probl~m i~ a
historical and empirical question. The same goes for other annnomies:
'realism' or 'relativism', 'materialism' or 'idealism'.
MARS/ Social Thought & Research
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utopian qualities.
'Communicative rationality' is Habennas' well-known proposal for a
nonnative basis of a rational, critical theory. I am quite sympathetic to
this, since it, just like my own propo~al ~s at a rational reconstruc,tion
of what must is presupposed m SOC1al action. However, Habermas', or
more correct, Apel's ambition of a 'final grounding' (LetzbegrUndun~ - a
rational final criteria for rationality - is hard to maintain. At least at one
point the communicative rationality is depending upon an irrational
criteria: that people must be willing to be rational.!1 This'decisionist'
criteria seems to be very hard to overcome. In this case, I think that
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Eros and Civilization Being, in the form of the playful Eros, is mobilized
against the dominating instrumental reaso~, because ~e Unbehagen h~~ to
be cured! This fact enables us to recognize an affinity between critical
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11 See Walter Reese-Schafer, Kart-OttoApe' ifir Einfiihnmg, where he criticizes both Apel and
Haberrnas on this point.
12 Cf. Alfons Sollner, 'Leftist Students of the Conservative Revolution'.
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